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inability of securing it. For example, the subpoena would be inadequate
in ascertaining in advance that which an adverse party alone knew
and which would be material and necessary in establishing a cause of
action or defense. A notice to produce, on the other hand, is of
value only when the moving party knows what he wants and can in-
troduce secondary evidence, in case, after a notice to produce, the ad-
verse party fails to produce the primary evidence. 27
These shortcomings were fortunately averted when statute created
the existing procedural form of "the examination before trial," a
requisite for astute litigators. V. J. M.
WHEN Am ASSIGNMENT MAY BE A SuB-LEAsE---The familiar prop-
osition that the transfer by lessee of the entire term of his lease,
results in a so-called "assignment" rather than a "sub-lease," has
been subjected to considerable reservation. There are three ways
in which the question ordinarily comes before the court. It is sub-
mitted that the aim of the suit and the parties at the Bar create*
equities,' which affect the determination, so that we reach a result
in which the terms "assignment" or "sub-lease" are merely conve-
nient instruments, legal fictions perhaps, by which the Courts arrive
at equitable results. The most convenient way of treating this subject,
will be by discussing seriatim, the three ways in which the question
usually arises. First, in an action by the landlord against the tenant in
possession, the transferee of the term, the instrument is called an as-
signment and the tenant in possession held bound by the covenants in
the original lease, Stewart v. Long Island Railroad Co. 2 emphasizes
this proposition. Stewart leased certain property to the Central Rail-
road Co. for a period of fifty years. Later the lease was assigned to
the Flushing, North Shore and Central Railroad Co. Then the latter
company leased to the defendant the whole of the property covered by
the Stewart lease for a term of ninety-nine years. The plaintiff brings
this action for rent, and claims that the defendant is liable as assignee
of the lease. The defendant contends it is not liable on the ground that
it is a sub-lessee. The court said, "Where a lessee of land leases the
same land to a third party, the question has often arisen whether the
second lease is in legal effect an assignment of the original lease, or a
mere sub-lease. The question has frequently and probably most gen-
erally, arisen between the lessee and his transferee, and much confu-
Carmody's N. Y. Prac. Sec. 342.
'Linden v. Hepburn, 3 Sandf. (N. Y.) 668; O'Connell v. Sugar Products
Co., 114 Misc. 540 (1st Dept. 1921).
2102 N. Y. 601, 8 N. E. 200 (1886) ; Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co., 129
Ill. 318, 21 N. E. 920 (1889).
NOTES AND COMMENT
sion will be avoided by observing the distinction between those cases
and cases where the question has been between the original landlord
and the transferee. In the latter class of cases, the rule is well settled
that if the lessee parts with his whole term, or interest as lessee, or
makes a lease for a period exceeding his whole term, it will as to the
landlord amount to an assignment, and the essence of the instrument
as an assignment, so far as the original lessor is concerned, will not be
destroyed by its reserving a new rent to the assignor, with a power of
reentry for non-payment, nor by its assuming, by the use of the word
demise or otherwise, the character of a sub-lease; and the assignee so
long as he continues to hold the estate, is liable directly to the original
lessor on all covenants in the original lease which run with the land,
including the covenant to pay rent." (As to the other class of cases,
the law will be discussed under the second proposition.)
This is not what might at first appear a baseless distinction for in
permitting the landlord to recover in actions on covenants in the original
lease against the transferee of the lessee, the court is enabling the land-
lord to get satisfaction from the one who is in actual enjoyment of the
property. This is, of course, as it should be and it was reasonable to
suppose that the court would employ its legal terminology to effectuate
this purpose. In no other way except by calling the instrument an as-
signment could this result be brought about. On the other hand, where
the action is by the lessee against the transferee, as is usual in the
second group of cases, to hold the instrument an assignment would
prevent the lessee from enforcing an express contract with his trans-
feree and would enable the transferee to elude his obligations under
that contract. It therefore follows that in this second class of cases
where the lessee is suing his transferee, the courts have wherever
possible held the transferring instrument to be a sub-lease.
In Linden v. Hepburn, 3 one Roosevelt leased property to Roux for
the term of May 1, 1845 to April 30, 1853. In March, 1848, Roux
transferred the lease to Linden and Fritz. Immediately after, Linden
and Fritz executed an instrument leasing to West a physical part of the
original premises for the entire balance of the term, but agreed that
Linden and Fritz should reserve a right of entry for any breach of the
covenants contained in the original lease. Defendant was in possession
under West. The covenants contained in the original lease were
breached and Linden and Fritz sought to declare a forfeiture and to
exercise their right of entry. The defendant claimed that the plaintiffs
bad no rights, as they had assigned their leasehold rights to West. It
was held, "Whatever the effect of this lease might be as between West
and the original lessor of the demised premises, we have no doubt as
'Linden v. Hepburn, supra, note 1.
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between West and the plaintiffs (lessees), it is to be regarded as a
sub-lease, and not an assignment of the original term."
The court in Stewart v. Long Island Railroad Co.,4 in discussing
the distinction between an action by the landlord against the tenant in
possession and an action by the lessee against the tenant in possession,
said, as to the latter proposition, "But as between the original lessee-
and his lessee, even though the original lessee demises his whole term,
if the parties intend a lease, the relation of landlord and tenant, as to
all but strict reversionary rights will arise between them."
The necessity of distinguishing between an assignment and a sub-
lease will also frequently arise as indicated in an action by a lessor
against his lessee to declare a forfeiture for breach of the covenant
not to assign or sublet, where there is a covenant either against sub-
letting or assigning but not both. It is submitted that this third type
of action represents more closely the second type than the first, on prin-
ciple, and the decision of Mr. Justice Wagner in O'Connell v. Sugar
Products Co. 4 would seem to indicate that authority has in this instance
followed principle. Aside from the general aversion to forfeiture
which has led courts to hold that a covenant against assignment is
not violated by:
a. An assignment for the benefit of the creditors.5
b. A lease for less than the full period.6
c. A sale on execution caused by a judgment-creditor7 of the
lessee.
d. A mortgage of the lease and the sale in foreclosure;8 and to
further hold that a similar covenant which also included prohibitions
against underletting is not violated by a change of the partners con-
stituting the lessee firm;9 nor by a sub-letting of part of the premises
and to further hold that a covenant not to sub-let for more than a two
year period is not breached where there is a contemporaneous agree-
ment given to the sub-lessee for successive two year period renewals;10
and that a covenant not to under-let is not violated by an assignment ;'.
and that no forfeiture results from a sale of the lease by the lessee in
'O'Connell v. Sugar Products Co., supra, note 1.
'84 Misc. 212, 145 N. Y. Supp. 868 (1914).
'Jackson v. Silvernail, 15 Johns. 278 (1818); Jackson v. Harrison, 17
Johns. 66 (1819).
'Jackson v. Silvernail, supra, note 6.
'Riggs v. Purcell, 66 N. Y. 193 (1876); Dunlap v. Mulry, 85 A. D. 498
(1st Dept. 1903) ; Johnstone v. Flickinger, 97 Misc. 169 (1916).
'Roosevelt v. Hopkins, 33 N. Y. 81 (1865).
10 Murdock v. Fishel, 67 Misc. 122 (1910).
"27 Barb. 415 (1857).
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bankruptcy contrary to express provisions of the lease,2-quite apart
from this expressed abhorrence of forfeitures which the courts have so
clearly enunciated, it would appear that an action by the lessor against
his lessee is in every particular identical with an action against his
transferee rather than with an action by the lessee against the trans-
feree of the lessee in possession.
Mr. Justice Wagner in the case cited above,13 definitely classifies
this group of cases with the second group mentioned above and the
outstanding similarity, of course, is that in both cases the action is by
the immediate transferor against his immediate transferee and it is to
enforce covenants between the parties themselves and not equities
which result from privity of estate.
Where the landlord prefers to sue for damages rather than to en-
force his supposed right to have the estate forfeited, or where he pre-
fers to evict the transferee of the lessee, the situation very closely re-
sembles that in the O'Connell case, Supra, and we have seen how the
court reacted in that situation. It is not therefore unlikely that the
courts will so extend that reasoning and in all of these cases where the
landlord is seeking either to forfeit or enforce his lease, that the trans-
ferring instrument will be regarded as a sub-lease rather than an as-
signment. The situation then boils down to this: that in nearly every
case very slight differences in content between the transferring instru-
ment and the main lease will suffice to constitute the latter a sub-lease
rather than an assignment, particularly when the result will help t6
avoid forfeiture but that in the *sole instance where the lessor is suing
the transferee of the lessee in possession to enforce covenants in the
original lease, this rule will be considerably relaxed and the instrument
will be regarded in nearly every case as an assignment in order to en-
able the landlord to obtain the benefits of his property. P. L.
"CORPORATE VOTING TRUSTS-VALIDITY-BANxxKs"-In a recent case '
which involved the validity of a voting trust agreement (under statute 2)
the material facts were, that in December 1924, certain stockholders of a
12 Gazley v.-Williams, 210 U. S. 41 (1907).
"O'Connell v. Sugar Products Co., supra, note 1.
'National Liberty Insurance Co. v. Bank of America, 214 N. Y. Supp.
643 (Sup. Ct. 1926) rev'd, 217 N. Y. Supp. 67 (App. Div. 1926) Tompers v.
Bank of America, ibid.
The two cases are identical with a very slight exception and were con-
sidered at the same time.
'Sec. 50 Stock Corporation Law in part, "A stockholder, by agreement
in writing, may transfer his stock to a voting trustee or trustees for the
purpose of conferring the right to vote thereon for a period not exceeding
ten years. Every other stockholder may transfer his stock to the same
